COVID-19, IP and access: will the current system of medical innovation and access to medicines meet global expectations? by Gurgula, O & Wen Hwa Lee




COVID-19, IP and access:  
will the current system of medical innovation and access to medicines  
meet global expectations? 
 
by Olga Gurgula* and Wen Hwa Lee** 1 
 




The COVID-19 pandemic has exposed the fundamental flaws in the current system of 
medical innovation and access to medicines, which require urgent attention from the global 
community. This is prompted by the experience of the past decades, which has proven that 
this system was ineffective in securing adequate access to medicines for all. The 
understanding of the deficiencies of the existing system is crucial today, as it may help to 
design effective approaches for improving access. This article will also consider 
mechanisms that may be implemented by governments for the protection of public health. 
These include short-term mechanisms, such as compulsory licensing and government use, 
as well as the long-term design of a new innovation model, including state-coordinated 
research of medicines and open innovation. The current system should be reconsidered to 
ensure the prompt development of COVID-19 therapy accessible to everyone and full 
preparedness for the pandemics of the future. 
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COVID-19 has brought multiple unprecedented critical challenges to the modern international 
community. It has severely shaken politics, the economy, environment and, most importantly, 
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healthcare. While the world readjusts to the new reality under confusing statistics, lockdowns and social 
distancing, the global race to develop effective new vaccines and treatment has started. 1 Often 
overlooked, intellectual property (‘IP’) is ever-present, adding man-made obstacles to challenging 
scenarios, such as the extraordinary case of the COVID-19 pandemic. Precious time and resources are 
currently ill-spent in IP negotiations, and the non-transparent nature of IP-related agreements may pose 
significant barriers to timely, affordable, and equitable access worldwide. More fundamentally, existing 
IP practices have already slowed down the reaction speed for the present pandemic and continue to 
hamper efforts in implementing global preparedness for future pandemics (Hoen, 2020a; Boseley, 
2020). 
 
COVID-19 has intensified the traditional debate on IP and access to medicines (Cueni, 2020; Hoen, 
2020b). This time, however, in addition to the conventional struggle between patent rights and access 
to affordable medicines, a new dimension has been brought to this debate. There is a significant concern 
that the existing manufacturing capacities may become a barrier to access once the vaccines and 
treatment are developed (IFPMA, 2020a). This is because these medicines will need to be promptly 
produced and distributed to billions of people worldwide. While pharmaceutical companies are racing 
to increase their manufacturing capacity (AstraZeneca, 2020a; Hargreaves, 2020; Johnson & Johnson, 
2020), this may not be enough for adequate allocation. As a result, some countries, most certainly 
wealthier western countries, will be the first to access these medicines, leaving others behind (Khamsi, 
2020). This was the case during the 2009 H1N1 influenza pandemic, when developed countries placed 
large advance orders and bought virtually all the output the vaccine companies could manufacture 
(Brown, 2009; Whalen, 2009; Fidler, 2010). Developing countries had to wait to access these 
medicines. Nothing was learned from the past. We are currently observing that wealthy countries, 
including the US, UK and the EU, are placing advance orders at risk for millions of doses of vaccines, 
prioritising the immunisation of their own citizens. This casts doubt about whether other countries will 
be able to access any vaccines in time (Cheng and Larson, 2020; Milne  and Crow, 2020). This vaccine 
(Rutschman, 2020) and treatment nationalism (Dutfield, 2020a) may have significant negative effect on 
public health, 2 because no country will be truly protected from COVID-19 until virtually the entire 
world is (Peiris and Leung, 2020).  
 
However, the insufficient manufacturing capacities may not be the main problem for access to COVID-
19 medicines. There is a fear that IP rights, and patents in particular, may pose a serious risk for the 
swift development of the COVID-19 vaccines and treatment, as well as the timely and affordable access 
to such medicines (UNITAID, 2020; Morten and Moss, 2020; Prabhala and Hoen, 2020; The Public 
Citizen, 2020). These fears are not without merit. For several decades, the problem of access to 
medicines has been a topic of heated debate at the international level (WTO, WIPO, WHO, 2020; High-
Level Panel on Access to Medicine, 2016). The central point has been the tension between, on the one 




hand, the exclusive rights stemming from patents and other IP rights that protect medicines and allow 
pharmaceutical companies to set prices, and, on the other hand, the problem of access to these medicines 
because of excessive prices.  
 
The aim of this article, therefore, is to expose the fundamental flaws of the current system of 
pharmaceutical innovation that affect the accessibility of medicines for millions of people. The 
understanding of these flaws is crucial in the time of the COVID-19 pandemic, as it may help to design 
effective approaches for improving access. The article argues that in its current state this system is not 
able to adequately combat pandemics, as well as providing affordable and equitable access to all. In 
particular, it will explain the proprietary nature of the current system based on strong IP protection and 
the effect it has on access to medicines. It will then consider mechanisms that may be utilised by 
governments for the protection of public health at the national and global level. The short-term 
mechanisms, discussed in this article, such as compulsory licensing and government use, will facilitate 
better access to patent-protected COVID-19 medicines during this pandemic. The long-term 
mechanisms of designing a new innovation model, such as state-coordinated research and production 
of medicines and open innovation, will improve the effectiveness and speed of innovation in this field, 
leading to an enhanced access to medicines and better preparedness for the pandemics of the future. 
        
 
 
1. The current system of pharmaceutical innovation: the proprietary model based on strong patent 
protection 
 
While patents often lead to unaffordably high drug prices (IMAK, 2018), pharmaceutical companies 
claim that they need strong patent protection to secure their investments in R&D (European 
Commission, 2009; IFPMA, 2020b). Therefore, the current legal framework has developed around the 
model of proprietary research conducted by private pharmaceutical companies, the outcomes of which 
are typically protected by multiple patents (IMAK, 2018). Such proprietary research has several 
negative consequences. First, it can lead to a waste of significant time and resources due to duplicative 
research activities by numerous pharmaceutical companies and the fragmentation of knowledge. 
Second, these companies typically seek to obtain the broadest and strongest patent protection for the 
results of their research to achieve market exclusivity, which allows them to set the price of their 
products. In turn, this often leads to problems of accessing these products due to high prices. 
 
However, the proprietary system of pharmaceutical innovation as we know it today has taken shape 
fairly recently. In the past, countries were free to develop their national IP-related policies to combat 
high prices and facilitate access to medicines in accordance with their local needs. Many countries 




denied patent protection on medicines or provided only limited protection to the process of their 
manufacture. Such an approach was based on the fear that patents would create monopolies over such 
an essential product as medicines (Ho, 2015; Pila, 2009). This, however, changed in 1995 when the 
WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of IP Rights (‘TRIPS’) came into force, which obliged all 
WTO members to provide patent protection to all types of technologies, including medicines (Abud 
Sittler et al, 2015). These new global rules, coupled with bilateral treaties that strengthen the protection 
even further (Musungu, 2004), and patent-related strategies by pharmaceutical companies directed at 
‘evergreening’ their market monopoly (Gurgula, 2020), resulted in many countries not being able to 
provide sufficient access to essential medicines for their populations. As was stated in the Report 
prepared by the UN High-Level Panel on Access to Medicines in 2016, diseases such as HIV, which 
have become manageable chronic conditions in developed countries, continue to kill millions of people 
in low- and middle-income countries because of the unaffordably high prices of patented medicines 
(High-Level Panel on Access to Medicine, 2016).  
 
Moreover, developed countries are also increasingly suffering from high drug prices, which put 
significant pressure on national healthcare budgets, forcing governments to reconsider their policies in 
this field. For example, in 2019 the US FDA approved Zolgensma, a gene therapy developed by 
Novartis for spinal muscular atrophy, the leading genetic cause of death in infants. The price of the one-
time treatment has been set by Novartis at a record $2.125 million, triggering debates about the 
escalating costs of prescription drugs and access to them (Nat Biotechnol 2019). The ‘skyrocketing’ 
prices of patented medicines in the US have prompted an investigation by the House Committee on 
Oversight and Reform (The US House Committee on Oversight and Reform, 2020a), which has recently 
held hearings with top executives of major drug companies to examine their pricing practices for some 
of the costliest drugs in the United States (The US House Committee on Oversight and Reform, 2020b).  
 
Realising the deficiencies of the current system, various calls from governments, international 
organisations, civil society and academics have been put forward aiming at controlling prices, 
facilitating access and stimulating genuine innovation (High-Level Panel on Access to Medicine, 2016). 




2. Is the current system of pharmaceutical innovation fit to fight the COVID-19 global pandemic? 
 
While the problem of access to medicines that stems from the current system is not new, what is 
disturbing today is that we are relying on this failed system to provide the solution to the global 
coronavirus pandemic by developing breakthrough medicines and providing affordable and equal 




access worldwide. Appreciating that the most pragmatic way to combat the pandemic is through 
collaboration and data sharing, the WHO has launched an unprecedented cooperation between countries 
and various institutions. It calls for action by key stakeholders and the global community ‘to voluntarily 
pool knowledge, IP and data necessary for COVID-19’ (WHO, 2020a). WHO director-general Tedros 
Adhanom Ghebreyesus noted that ‘[b]ased on strong science and open collaboration, this information-
sharing platform will help provide equitable access to life-saving technologies around the world’ 
(WHO, 2020b). Other initiatives for voluntarily sharing the relevant knowledge, IP and data to enable 
widescale and worldwide production, distribution and use of such technologies and necessary raw 
materials include the Technology Access Partnership hosted by the UN Technology Bank (TAP, 2020) 
and the Open COVID Pledge Initiative (Open COVID Pledge, 2020). While such initiatives to share IP 
knowledge and patent pools are not new, their experience in facilitating access to medicines may be 
invaluable in accelerating the development of COVID-19 vaccines and treatment (Medicines Patent 
Pool, 2020). Even the European Commission is temporarily adjusting its views, understanding that ‘this 
extraordinary situation may trigger the need for companies to cooperate in order to ensure the supply 
and fair distribution of scarce products to all consumers’, and therefore it will ‘not actively intervene 
against necessary and temporary measures put in place in order to avoid a shortage of supply.’ 
(European Commission, 2020). However, while impressive as to the scale of their potential, all these 
initiatives are lacking the most important key player – the pharmaceutical industry (Mancini and Peel, 
2020; Medicines Law & Policy, 2020a; IFPMA, 2020a). Without its active participation in these and 
other initiatives the chances for success of such endeavours are rather slim.  
 
Unfortunately, it seems that pharmaceutical companies are reluctant to engage in these initiatives, as 
this would mean sharing their IP (Ren, 2020). In the recent briefing organised by the International 
Federation of Pharmaceutical Manufacturers and Associations, chief executives from Pfizer, 
GlaxoSmithKline, AstraZeneca and J&J, which are all currently in the race to develop COVID-19 
vaccines and treatment, were unsupportive of the WHO initiative of sharing IP (IFPMA, 2020a; 
Mancini and Peel, 2020; Lovett, 2020). As a result, this pandemic has exposed our pervasive 
dependence on private pharmaceutical companies. While several pharmaceutical companies have 
declared that they will make their vaccines available at cost for the duration of the COVID-19 pandemic 
(AstraZeneca, 2020b; Scheuber, 2020; Wu, 2020; Peel at el., 2020), we must not forget that the 
pharmaceutical industry is a profit-oriented business. Moreover, it is not designed to operate in such 
extraordinary circumstances. Pharmaceutical companies are responding to the crisis by doing what they 
have been optimising to do in the recent years: a competitive race of proprietary research in parallel to 
each other, teaming up with small tech companies or universities to boost their chances. While in normal 
circumstances, this rivalry could be beneficial by providing different options to tackle a disease, the 
current circumstances and timelines are not ordinary. Therefore, the normal mechanisms of competition 
should not control the development of the solutions that are literally expected to save the world. Despite 




numerous claims being made by pharmaceutical companies that it is not ‘business as usual’ anymore 
(IFPMA, 2020c), the reality is different. COVID-19 has not altered the operation of the industry. 
Pharmaceutical companies are engaging in proprietary research and generating their proprietary data, 
the outcomes of which will still be protected by IP rights. This results in an enormous expenditure of 
resources and time, with unpredictable outcomes both in terms of efficacy/safety of the researched 
medicines (Mallapaty and Ledford, 2020), as well as the price it will cost for society. 3  
  
This reveals two fundamental flaws in the current system. First, a proprietary/competitive model slows 
down the success as it prevents researchers from working together in tackling the virus in contrast to a 
more open and collaborative model by pooling resources and efforts and leading to faster and more 
efficacious outcomes. Second, any resulting therapy developed by pharmaceutical companies will be 
protected by patents, allowing them to control the production and price of, as well as access to the 




3. Short-term measures to ensure affordable and equitable access to COVID-19 medicines using 
available mechanisms: compulsory licensing and government use  
 
Pharmaceutical companies continue to actively patent the results of their research (Koons, 2020; 
Prabhala and Hoen, 2020), and, therefore, the effect of such practices on access to COVID-19 therapy 
should be considered. As discussed above, patents bestow exclusive rights upon their owners. This 
means that the patent holder has the right to prevent others from using his or her invention, and thus 
control the manufacture and distribution of such products, including their prices (Correa, 2020). As a 
result, patents may preclude the possibility of purchasing medicines at low prices or in required 
quantities because, for example, they are priced at a level that is not affordable for patients or 
government bodies, or the patent holder is not able to supply a sufficient amount of such medicines 
(ibid). In these circumstances, patent holders have the right to prevent supplies from alternative sources 
(ibid). This is particularly dangerous today as the exclusive patent rights to COVID-19 vaccines and 
medicines may restrict or even block access to such a therapy. This danger is especially significant for 
developing countries that may not be able to procure a sufficient amount of patent-protected COVID-
19 vaccines and treatment due to high prices.  
 
While patents provide exclusive rights, the exercise of such rights by the patent holder may be limited 
in view of public interests, including the protection of public health (ibid). International laws contain 
specific mechanisms, such as ‘compulsory licences’ and ‘government use for non-commercial 
purposes’, which allow restricting the exercise of exclusive rights under the patent. These mechanisms 




can be found in Article 31 of the TRIPS Agreement. Moreover, in 2001, the Doha Declaration on the 
TRIPS Agreement and Public Health 4 confirmed that the granting of compulsory licences was one of 
the flexibilities under the TRIPS Agreement, which all WTO members have the right to use if 
necessary. 5 These mechanisms have been implemented in the majority of jurisdictions worldwide and 
may be relied upon to address public health needs (ibid).  
 
A compulsory licence is an authorisation granted by a state authority that allows the person who receives 
it to use the invention without the agreement of the patent holder (Medicines Law & Policy, 2020b). 
While most countries have integrated the regime of compulsory licences into their IP legislation, the 
grounds for granting such licences may vary (European Patent Academy, 2018). The typical grounds 
include the following: (a) market demand not sufficiently satisfied, (b) exploitation of patent rights 
violates competition law (e.g. excessive prices), (c) patentees abuse their exclusive rights; (d) public 
interest (e.g. health, environment, economic development, national security); (e) dependent patents (e.g. 
technical improvement) (Biadgleng, 2009).   
 
To help governments in securing a sufficient amount of COVID-19 medicines, a special type of 
compulsory licence can be utilised. This is called ‘government use’ (Pochart et al., 2020), 6 under which 
the state grants authorisation for its own use, meaning that such authorisation is given to a state agency 
or department, or even to a private entity (Medicines Law & Policy, 2020b). The effectiveness of this 
mechanism manifests in the fact that the government is not required to send a formal request to the 
patent holder, it can act ex officio to tackle specific public health issues (Correa, 2020). This means that 
governments will not need to spend time on negotiating a licence, as required by Article 31 TRIPS in 
relation to a normal compulsory licence, but can grant a government use when it considers it necessary.      
 
While this mechanism was implemented in the TRIPS Agreement as one of the flexibilities to balance 
strong protection stemming from the exclusive patent rights, it has not been used frequently. Among 
the relatively small number of government uses, the majority of such authorisations were granted by 
developing countries that were unable to satisfy the needs of their population in life-saving treatments 
for such diseases as HIV, Hepatitis C and cancer, due to the high prices charged by the pharmaceutical 
companies – the patent owners. 7 For example, in 2017, the Government of Malaysia issued a 
compulsory licence on the Hepatitis C treatment sofosbuvir (Sovaldi) as the price for this medicine was 
prohibitively high (Treatment Action Group, 2017). Such an infrequent use of this mechanism by 
developing countries was mainly due to significant political pressure from developed countries 
(typically the US and EU), which required developing countries to refrain from granting compulsory 
licences that would affect the interests of multinational pharmaceutical companies under the threat of 
retaliation (Radhakrishnan and Amin, 2013; Reichman, 2010). This was despite the fact that, as was 




noted above, the grant of a government use or compulsory licence was in line with the provisions of the 
TRIPS Agreement and, therefore, any WTO member has the right to utilise it.  
 
Since the adoption of the TRIPS Agreement in 1995 and before the COVID-19 pandemic, developed 
countries used this mechanism (both compulsory licensing and government use) only a few times. One 
of the rare examples is Italy. In 2017, due to the high price of Hepatitis C medicines, the Italian 
government granted its citizens the right to import more affordable generic versions for their personal 
use (Hoen et al, 2018). Another rare example is Germany, where the court granted a compulsory licence 
for the HIV drug raltegravir based on public interest (GRUR, 2017). However, this mechanism has 
attracted closer attention during the COVID-19 pandemic. Some countries have already granted 
compulsory licences for medicines that can be used in treating COVID-19 patients. For example, on 18 
March 2020 Israel’s Minister of Health issued a permit to the state allowing the importation of Kaletra 
(lopinavir 200mg/ritonavir 50mg) for the purpose of medicinal treatment of COVID-19 patients (KEI, 
2020). Other countries have been changing their national laws to make this mechanism more efficient. 
This includes Germany (Hoen, 2020a; Pochart et al, 2020). 8 In particular, Section 13 of the German 
Patent Act (‘GPA’) enables the federal government to issue orders for the use of an invention to 
protect public welfare by the government or government-appointed third parties (Fuchs, 2020). 9 To 
make this mechanism more efficient during the pandemic, on 28 March 2020, the German 
government passed a ‘corona crisis package’, which introduced several changes to existing laws 
(Klopschinski ,2020). 10 It has amended, inter alia, the Act on the Prevention and Control of Infectious 
Diseases in Humans and introduced, among others, Section 5 which provides the Ministry of Health 
with additional powers to control the epidemic situation, including the authority to order restrictions on 
patents in accordance with Section 13 GPA (ibid). This can be done in relation to specific products 
which can be used for public welfare, such as pharmaceuticals, medical devices, laboratory 
diagnostics, items of personal protective equipment and products for disinfection. 11 
 
To prevent any delays in accessing COVID-19 therapy governments should utilise all the available 
mechanisms. With respect to patent-protected therapy, one of the effective tools, as was discussed 
above, is government use. 12 It is provided by the TRIPS Agreement and can be found in most 
national patent laws. It is, however, important to review national laws on government use and amend 
them where necessary to maximise the effectiveness of this mechanism, making sure that there will 
be no barriers in using it when required. Moreover, governments, especially in developing countries, 
should not refrain from authorising government use based on their fears of political retaliation from 
developed countries. Today, both developing and developed countries should use all the tools 
available to ensure that COVID-19 therapy is accessible to their population in a sufficient amount 
and at a price they can afford.      
  





4. Long-term measures to ensure affordable and equitable access to medicines globally  
  
While the measures discussed above may provide a solution for affordable access to certain COVID-
19 therapeutics in the short term, they will not solve the problem of access in general. Such an 
unprecedented global pandemic is the result of a global market failure, which needs urgent intervention. 
To avoid the universal problem with access to COVID-19 medicines, as well as to prepare for the future 
pandemics, the current system requires drastic changes. There are a number of options for such changes 
available today. These include, for example, a state-coordinated research and production of medicines 
to fight pandemics, and the development of a new model of open innovation.  
 
The first approach essentially means that the state should assume the function and responsibility for the 
preparedness to such health-related risks as pandemics. A comprehensive infrastructure should be set 
in place, which would cover both the research into and production of medicines needed for health 
security (Brown, 2010). Therefore, the establishment of new specifically designated research centres to 
investigate and prepare for new pandemics, and setting up the infrastructures for the development and 
manufacture of medicines by countries, may help to reduce the risks of new pandemics, as well as 
securing access to essential medicines when the pandemic ends.    
 
Another option is to create a system of open innovation, in which access to information, data and 
technologies could be freely achieved. ‘While innovation is critical, the usual process of managing 
innovation does not seem to work anymore’ (Chesbrough, 2003). This is the view that Chesbrough 
expressed almost 20 years ago and it is still valid today. He explained that the old paradigm of 
innovation was based on the closed model, where companies generate their ideas, develop, build, market 
and finance them on their own (ibid). One of the implicit rules of this model is ‘we should control our 
IP, so that our competitors don’t profit from our ideas’ (ibid). He further claimed that this paradigm 
created a ‘virtuous circle’, in which companies invested in their R&D, which led to breakthroughs, 
increasing their profits, which were then reinvested back into their internal R&D (ibid). Since IP was 
vigorously protected, others could not use it for their own profit (ibid). This paradigm that according to 
Chesbrough worked for most of the twentieth century has become unsustainable in the twenty-first 
century (ibid; Dutfield, 2020), and the pharmaceutical industry is a good example. Despite the alleged 
surge in investments into pharmaceutical R&D, the pipeline of breakthrough medicines is decreasing, 
with very few truly novel medicines being developed recently (Pammolli et al,. 2011; Scannell et al., 
2012; Light and Lexchin, 2012; IMAK, 2018). Realising that the closed model of innovation in this 
field is not viable anymore, pharmaceutical companies have been increasingly turning to external 
sources of innovation (Schuhmacher et al., 2018). During recent years, pharmaceutical companies have 
been establishing collaborations with academic centres of excellence, building innovation centres, 




creating joint ventures with academic institutions (public-private partnerships), setting precompetitive 
consortia, or experimenting with crowdsourcing and virtual R&D (ibid). 
 
These new approaches, however, are mainly followed if they fit with companies’ traditional, 
predominantly internal (i.e. closed) R&D models and in research areas that do not affect their major 
franchises (ibid). Despite the great potential that the open innovation model may bring to society in this 
field, the pharmaceutical industry has been hesitant to utilise it. One of the main reasons is that this will 
mean changes to their traditional approaches, as well as because of the fear of losing control over their 
valuable IP assets. The apogee of this state of affairs is the current pandemic, in which pharmaceutical 
companies have refused to share their IP with the open innovation pledges discussed above, which 
would allow an acceleration of the process of developing the COVID-19 therapy. This system based on 
the closed (or semi-closed) model of innovation that relies on strong IP protection, which has already 
proven to be ineffective in the past, poses a risk to humanity by preventing researchers from accessing 
the valuable information related to COVID-19 therapeutics that is currently being generated in hundreds 
of laboratories worldwide. If employed, the open innovation model would eliminate ‘the fragmentation 
of knowledge that is inherent to the IP-driven pharma industry’ (ibid) and would allow a free flow of 
information, enabling more efficient use of resources and faster development of medicines, including 
for COVID-19. 
 
Both options have their pros and cons, which need to be carefully assessed prior to their implementation. 
For example, the establishment of the state infrastructure would allow countries to be better prepared 
for pandemics in the future without overreliance on the private pharmaceutical business. However, it 
may lead to inequality of access, since wealthier countries would be in a better position to create such 
infrastructures, while poor countries will not be able to do this. On the other hand, the open innovation 
system may help to boost medical research, as access to crucial information will not be restricted by IP 
rights, thus allowing scientists around the world to share and utilise such data for the benefit of society. 
This will mean that the system of IP protection would need to be redesigned, so that it would not create 
a barrier for access. However, as was mentioned above, pharmaceutical companies argue that without 
the current level of IP protection, they will have no incentives to engage in R&D. Therefore, alternative 
incentives for pharmaceutical companies may need to be developed in order to attract their interest in 
this new system. For example, such incentives may be based on performance, with governments 












While the model for a new system of medical innovation and access is yet to be developed, what is clear 
today is that the long overdue changes to the current system are inevitable. This pandemic has exposed 
the fundamental flaws in the existing system which require urgent attention from the global community. 
This is prompted by the experience of the past several decades, which has proven that this system was 
ineffective in securing adequate access to medicines for all. It has also exposed our overwhelming 
dependence on the private pharmaceutical business for protecting global health security. It is paramount 
that governments utilise all available mechanisms that would ensure swift and equitable access to 
COVID-19 therapy, including issuing compulsory licenses and authorising government uses where 
necessary. Moreover, drawing on past experience, we need to fundamentally and urgently rethink the 
model of medical innovation and access in order to ensure that we are able to find prompt solutions for 
the development of COVID-19 medicines which will be accessible to everyone, as well as allowing us 
to be fully prepared for the pandemics of the future. For this, all the stakeholders, including 
governments, pharmaceutical companies, international non-governmental bodies, non-profit 
organisations, academics, and public initiatives, must work together to find the most suitable and 
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